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Legitimate Intergenerational Constitutionalism
by Iñigo González-Ricoy
A bstract: This p ap er examines the le- 
/  I  gitim a cy  cond itions o f  constitution- 
JL  J L  alism by exam ining on e particu la r 
type o f  constitu tiona l provision : provisions 
a im ed  a t advan cin g fu tu r e  generations’ in ter­
ests. A fter cover in g  the m ain fo rm s that such 
provision s can adopt, i t  f i r s t  considers three 
legitim acy ga in s o f  constitu tionalising them. 
I t then explores tw o legitim acy concerns that 
so d o in g  raises. Given that constitutions are 
d ifficu lt to am end, constitutionalisation may 
threaten fu tu r e  generations’ sovereignty. And 
i t  may also make the constitu tions con ten t 
impossible to adapt to changin g circum stances 
a n d  interests. Finally, th e p ap er examines the 
ways in w h ich  such concerns may be addressed  
a t the adoption, form u la tion , a n d  am end­
m en t stages. In particu lar, i t  discusses i f  the 
use o f  sunset clauses a n d  regular constitu tional 
conven tion s may, a n d  under w ha t conditions, 
successfully address such concerns.
Introduction1
From an intergenerational standpoint, con­
stitutions raise serious procedural legitima­
cy concerns. For one thing, once adopted, 
constitutions are almost by definition rig­
id, as they typically impose amendment 
requirements, such as parliamentary su­
permajorities or approval by referendum, 
that are more cumbersome than ordinary 
law-making procedures. By making their 
content resilient to change, they may not 
be able to adjust to an evolving society, and 
may end up not reflecting future individu­
als’ interests and circumstances. For anoth­
er, given that future generations will have 
a hard time amending the constitution’s 
content should they wish to do so, consti­
tutions can end up imposing the will of the 
founding generation on subsequent gene­
rations, hence undermining future genera­
tions’ sovereignty — i.e., their ability to live 
under rules of their own choosing. These 
two concerns are particularly worrisome 
when perpetuity clauses are included in the 
constitution, as these make (part of) the 
constitution’s content impossible to amend. 
However, constitutions can also produce 
intergenerational legitimacy benefits. By 
entrenching democratic rules and funda­
mental rights against change, for example,
they make it more likely for future gener­
ations to live under those rules and enjoy 
these rights. Further, when constitutions 
include provisions of environmental justice, 
fiscal fairness, or pension system sustaina­
b ility — as many existing constitutions do
— they can advance the interests of future 
generations in more specific ways.2 For 
example, given that constitutions enjoy 
normative priority over ordinary statutes 
and are typically enforced by independent 
bodies, they can force elected officials — 
who often prioritise the short-term for elec­
toral reasons — to better take into account 
future individuals’ interests. They can also 
help public and private actors to overcome 
coordination problems in intergeneration- 
ally sensitive policy domains, such as cli­
mate change mitigation or investment in 
blue-sky research, in which such actors may 
be tempted to free ride on others’ efforts. 
Finally, they can credibly signal the impor­
tance of intergenerational hazards to the 
general public, hence increasing citizens’ 
willingness to take into account the inter­
ests of future individuals and to support 
far-sighted policies.
Given how fragile democratic institutions 
and fundamental rights often are, and how 
often future generations are dismissed in 
policy-making domains in which their in­
terests are likely to be profoundly affected, 
constitutional means to protect such insti­
tutions and rights and to advance future 
individuals’ interests may not only raise 
procedural legitimacy concerns. They may 
also importantly enhance the substantive 
legitimacy of policy-making in intergenera- 
tionally sensitive domains, i.e. it may make 
its outcomes intergenerationally fairer. In 
short, constitutions may bring both substan­
tiv e  benefits and procedural threats from 
the standpoint of their intergenerational 
legitimacy.3 They are, as Axel Gosseries has 
put it, a double-edged sword.4
Constitutions can end up imposing 
the will of the founding generation 
on subsequent generations, hence 
undermining future generations’ 
sovereignty -  i.e., their ability to live 
under rules of their own choosing.
In this paper I shall focus on a particu­
lar case that nicely illustrates this tension
— namely on provisions that are aimed at 
protecting future generations' interests and 
that, albeit included in a constitution and 
thus resilient to change, are not necessarily 
protected by a perpetuity clause. Two rea­
sons motivate this choice. First, provisions 
aimed at protecting the interests of future 
individuals are considered, rather than con­
stitutional provisions in general, because the 
tension between the legitimacy benefits and 
threats of constitutional rigidity is clearer in 
the former case. Since the goal of the pa­
per is to address the legitimacy benefits and 
shortcomings of constitutionalism, these 
provisions provide a particularly informa­
tive case. Second, rigid yet amendable pro­
visions, rather than provisions protected by 
perpetuity clauses, are considered because, 
while the two above-mentioned concerns 
are more pressing in the latter case, perpe­
tuity clauses are seldom included in exist­
ing constitutions, the content of which is 
typically rigid — and often very rigid indeed
— yet amendable. Further, to my knowledge 
no single constitutional provision that is 
aimed at advancing the interests of future 
generations an d  protected by a perpetuity 
clause can be found in existing constitu- 
tions.5 Now, since the concerns and some 
of the benefits that w ill be examined in the 
paper also apply to more general provisions 
(as well as to intergenerational provisions), 
and to provisions protected by perpetuity 
clauses (as well as to rigid-yet-amendable 
provisions), the implications of what is ex­
amined throughout the paper will also be 
drawn for these cases.
The goal of this paper is to examine the le­
gitimacy conditions of constitutionalism. 
This is pursued in two steps. It first explores 
the main substantive legitimacy gains that 
intergenerational provisions, as I shall refer 
to provisions aimed at protecting or ad­
vancing the interests of future individuals, 
may generate.6 It then examines the main 
procedural legitimacy threats of constitu- 
tionalising these and more general provi­
sions, and the ways in which such threats 
may be mitigated when constitutional pro­
visions are properly adopted, formulated,
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and amended. More specifically, the paper 
explores whether the use of sunset clauses 
and regular constitutional conventions to 
amend the content of constitutional provi­
sions, intergenerational and otherwise, may 
successfully address the legitimacy concerns 
mentioned above. As we shall see, sunset 
clauses present insurmountable problems in 
this regard. Periodic constitutional conven­
tions, on the other hand, may do so only 
under certain conditions of inclusiveness, 
deliberation, and collective authorisation. 
For, as we shall see, what is crucial from the 
standpoint of intergenerational legitimacy 
is that constitutional provisions be adopted 
and amended under above-ordinary norma­
tive conditions while preserving legal cer­
tainty and stability, something that sunset 
clauses are not particularly appropriate to 
deliver, and regular constitutional conven­
tions can only deliver under very specific 
conditions.
The paper proceeds in four further sections. 
The next section briefly outlines the main 
forms that intergenerational constitution­
al provisions can adopt, illustrating these 
forms with a number of examples from ex­
isting provisions and court decisions. Then, 
the main substantive legitimacy gains that 
constitutionalising these provisions can 
produce are examined. The next section, in 
turn, looks into the main procedural legiti­
macy concerns raised by constitutionalising 
these as well as more general provisions, 
and the ways in which such concerns may 
be relieved at the adoption, formulation, 
and amendment stages. Finally, whether 
sunset clauses and regular constitutional 
conventions are appropriate to address such 
concerns, and under what conditions, is 
considered. The conclusion summarises the 
intergenerational legitimacy gains and loss­
es examined above, and discusses whether 
an all-things-considered case for the inter­
generational legitimacy of constitutional- 
ising intergenerational and other types of 
provisions can be made.
Intergenerationa! constitutional 
provisions
Constitutions are intergenerational legal in­
struments almost by definition, given that 
they are typically hard to amend and thus
likely to last across generations. Amongst 
the provisions they m ay include, however, 
intergenerational provisions are particular­
ly  noteworthy from an intergenerational 
perspective, as they explicitly target future 
individuals’ interests. They can do so in a 
number of ways. Sometimes, they aim at 
protecting or advancing future individu­
als’ interests by reference to their general 
interests, such as the “responsibility to­
wards future generations” included in the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic and in 
the Swiss Federal Constitution. Some oth­
er times, they do so by reference to some 
particular interests of future individuals
— such as their fiscal sustainability, as the 
“debt brake” recently adopted by several 
European countries and US states is often 
justified, or their environmental safety, as 
many existing constitutions nowadays do. 
Hence, for example, the Norwegian Con­
stitution states that the environmental right 
to “an environment that is conducive to 
health” and to be “informed of the state of 
the natural environment”, “be safeguarded 
for future generations as well”. Similarly, 
the Constitution of Chile includes a fun­
damental right “to live in an environment 
free from contamination”, which the Chil­
ean Supreme Court has often interpreted as 
addressing not only current generations but 
also future ones.
W hen intergenerational provisions are 
constitutionally enshrined, they show a 
number of features that are crucial for the 
proper advancement of future generations’ 
interests. First, they are part of a legal doc­
ument — the constitution — with normative 
priority over ordinary statutes (in the sense 
that, when an incompatibility between the 
former and the latter exists, the former pre­
vails). Second, they can only be amended 
by means that are more cumbersome than 
ordinary law-making procedures, such as 
parliamentary supermajorities or referen­
dum requirements. Third, and finally, they 
are typically enforceable by some independ­
ent body — a constitutional court or some 
other type of body, such as a fiscal council
— with the ability to review, and in some 
cases turn down, statutes or administrative 
actions that may deviate from what the rel­
evant provision mandates.
Let us briefly explore how these features 
can, when intergenerational provisions 
are included in the constitution, advance 
future individuals’ interests. Consider the 
Chilean Constitution mentioned above. 
In 1988, in Pedro Flores v. Corporación d e l
Cobre, Codelco, D ivisión d e l Salvador, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional 
environmental right to “live in an environ­
ment free from contamination” in a lawsuit 
aimed at stopping the deposition of copper 
m ill tailings onto the beaches of Chile in 
order to safeguard marine life. Similarly, 
in C om unidad d e Chañaral v. Codeco 
División e l  Saldor, the Supreme Court 
upheld a farmer’s constitutional right to life 
by prohibiting the drainage of Lake Chun- 
gará.7
Constitutions are intergenerational 
legal instruments almost by definition, 
given that they are typically hard to 
amend and thus likely to last across 
generations.
These two cases, however, were just a prec­
edent to an extraordinary decision made 
in 1997, when the Supreme Court struck 
down the government’s previous approval of 
the Rio Condor Project, a logging project in 
Tierra de Fuego, after finding that it threat­
ened the constitutional right “to live in an 
environment free from contamination”.8 
There are a number of reasons why the de­
cision is relevant for the issue at hand. To 
begin with, the Court upheld the constitu­
tional environmental right just mentioned 
against a decision made by the Chilean 
government to let a US-based corporation 
log 270,000 hectares of pristine forest — a 
project that was worth $350 million. In so 
doing, it put in practice some of the fea­
tures mentioned above, namely the priority 
of the constitution’s content, including the 
environmental rights included in it, and the 
ability of the Court to revise and eventually 
turn down the government’s decisions when 
these are considered to threaten such con­
tent. In addition to this, the court interpret­
ed the constitutional environmental right 
as protecting “not only present generations 
but also future ones”, thus acknowledging 
future individuals’ interests as protected by 
the constitution as well as intergenerational 
standing, i.e. the right of present individu­
als to sue on behalf of future generations.9 
O f course, intergenerational provisions are 
not always equally adopted, formulated, and 
enforced or have the same constitutional 
status. For example, while intergenerational 
provisions are sometimes enshrined as fun­
damental rights, thus granting their holders 
a subjective, personal guarantee and heavily 
constraining governmental action as a re­
sult, they are often enshrined as statements
What is crucial from the standpoint 
of intergenerational legitimacy is that 
constitutional provisions be adopted 
and amended under above-ordinary 
normative conditions [...].
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of public policy, and hence merely guide, 
rather than lim it, governmental action. 
Also, while intergenerational provisions 
are often formulated in abstract terms, as 
general principles rather than precise rules, 
they sometimes adopt very specific formu­
lations — e.g. when they set a specific debt 
ceiling or declare specific areas as national 
parks. W hen the latter is the case, judicial 
discretion is heavily reduced — yet so is the 
ability of the enforcing body to adjust their 
understanding of intergenerational provi­
sions as scientific and moral change occurs 
over time and across generations. Finally, 
while intergenerational provisions are often 
drafted by ad hoc conventions constituted 
by members of civil society and adopted 
by means that are inclusive of all citizens, 
such as when ratification referendums are 
employed, at some other times they are 
drafted and adopted by merely parliamen­
tary means. A case in point is the balanced 
budget amendment and debt brake added 
to article 135 of the Spanish Constitution 
in 2011, which was drafted in August, when 
most citizens were on holiday, and adopted 
by parliament w ith little discussion and no 
submission to ratification by referendum. 
These and some further distinctions are cru­
cial for the issue at hand. For, depending on 
how constitutional provisions, intergenera­
tional and otherwise, are adopted, phrased, 
and amended, very different legitimacy 
concerns arise. Before turning to them, and 
to the legitimacy concerns they may gener­
ate, in the next section we briefly explore 
the potential benefits that constitutionalisa- 
tion may bring about.
The benefits o f intergenerational 
constitutionalism
The goal of this paper is to examine the in­
tergenerational legitimacy of constitution- 
alisation as well as the means that may be 
used to mitigate the legitimacy concerns 
it may generate. Considering its potential 
benefits, if  only briefly, is necessary for this 
task because, as Allen Buchanan has recent­
ly  argued, institutional legitimacy crucially 
depends on how badly we would be affected 
in the absence of the relevant institution.10 
Hence, if  the consequences of forgoing an 
institution are sufficiently hazardous, moral 
desiderata, such as sovereignty, may be sac­
rificed with less legitimacy loss than if  such 
consequences are less grave.
In order to properly assess the legitima­
cy of constitutionalising certain rules or 
principles, we therefore need to consider
the benefits that so doing may bring about
— and how badly we would be affected if 
this did not happen — before we consider 
the legitimacy costs that it may generate. In 
the next two sections I shall argue that such 
costs are often merely apparent, and that 
constitutional provisions, both intergener­
ational and otherwise, need not generate 
grave legitimacy concerns if  properly adopt­
ed, formulated, and amended. However, 
even i f  what I shall defend in those sections 
were wrong, it may nonetheless be the case 
that a scenario in which a constitution is in 
place is, on balance, more legitimate than 
an alternative scenario in which no con­
stitution is in force, if  the net costs of the 
latter scenario happen to outweigh the net 
costs of the former. It is dubious that con- 
stitutionalising provisions that only target 
present individuals’ interests may provide 
in tergenera tiona l benefits that are sufficient­
ly  significant to outweigh such costs. The 
same does not apply to intergenerational 
provisions, however. For, as I shall argue, 
they are able to deliver such benefits.
Intergenerational provisions are 
not always equally adopted, 
formulated, and enforced or have 
the same constitutional status.
In this section, I thus focus on intergenera­
tional provisions and on their main poten­
tial benefits. I do so by drawing upon the 
wealth of constitutional political economy, 
political science, and legal philosophy liter­
atures. I proceed by briefly describing three 
important intergenerational shortcomings 
of ordinary policy-making in the absence of 
constitutional constraints. I then examine 
how constitutionalising intergenerational 
provisions may contribute to overcoming 
such shortcomings, thus delivering the ben­
efits mentioned above.11 
First, properly taking into account the inter­
ests of future generations typically requires 
adopting policies, such as forestry preser­
vation, investment in early education, or 
switching to low-carbon technologies, that 
impose short-term pain for long-term gain. 
W hen voters evaluate candidates on their 
aggregate performance, far-sighted policies 
like these are vulnerable to electoral cycles, 
for incumbents seeking re-election may be 
tempted to postpone their adoption. They 
may prioritise alternative policies with 
benefits arriving before the next election, 
thus passing the buck of not adopting such 
far-sighted policies to others in the future.
Constitutionalisation of intergenerational 
provisions can help overcome this problem 
by taking the final authority on the provi­
sions’ content away from elected officials, 
or at least by raising the costs the latter face 
if  they deviate in policy-making from their 
content. Further, since far-sighted policies 
typically need to be sustained over extend­
ed periods of time (think, for example, of 
investment in blue-sky research), constitu- 
tionalisation increases the likelihood that 
future officials will not deviate from poli­
cies adopted by previous officials, as much 
as they would like to do it for electoral or 
ideological reasons.
Second, many intergenerationally valuable 
goods are to a large extent common goods 
(e.g. environmental safety) or public goods 
(e.g. public security), meaning that in both 
cases it is not possible to prevent people who 
have not contributed to their provision from 
having access to them (i.e. they are non-ex- 
cludable). This implies that their delivery is 
particularly prone to coordination failures, 
both amongst contemporaries and between 
non-overlapping generations. For instance, 
public bodies and private companies may 
decide not to reduce their carbon emissions 
if  they know that others will reduce their 
own emissions, thus free-riding on the lat- 
ter’s effort. Alternatively, well-intended and 
cooperative institutional actors may hesitate 
to reduce their carbon emissions if they have 
no guarantee that others in the present or in 
the future will similarly do their share.
Constitutional provisions, both 
intergenerational and otherwise, 
need not generate grave legitimacy 
concerns if properly adopted, 
formulated, and amended.
Constitutionalisation can contribute to 
m itigating such coordination failures by 
setting long-term goals to which private 
and public bodies may converge. Since, as 
part of the constitution’s content, such goals 
enjoy normative priority over ordinary stat­
utes and are legally enforceable by bodies 
that are typically independent from elect­
ed officials, constitutionalisation can both 
force potential free-riders to do their share 
and provide cooperative actors who distrust 
others w ith additional guarantees that the 
latter will do their share. Further, since such 
goals are hard to amend, future incumbents 
are less likely to deviate from them, thus 
contributing to m itigating coordination 
problems not only amongst contemporaries 
but also over time and across generations.
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Third, and finally, given that future indi­
viduals do not yet exist, and that the 
circumstances in which they w ill live as 
well as the particular interests that they will 
have are uncertain to us, it is unsurprising 
that they often go unnoticed to present 
citizens. In addition to this, given that the 
sort of policies needed to advance their 
interests are likely to mature slowly over 
extended periods of time and to bring about 
long-term and uncertain outcomes, ordi­
nary citizens are often hesitant to endorse 
this sort of policy, for which the payoff is 
uncertain.
Constitutions provide two responses to 
these clusters of problems. First, by grant­
ing intergenerational provisions the status 
of higher law, on a par w ith other basic 
rights and freedoms, a constitution signals 
the moral importance of future individuals’ 
interests, the seriousness of long-term haz­
ards, and the necessity of taking action to 
address them — and, given that so doing is 
likely to impose costs in the present, such 
signalling turns out to be credible.12 Sec­
ond, given that citizens are more familiar 
with the constitution’s content than with 
ordinary statutes, constitutionalisation 
makes intergenerational provisions’ con­
tent clearer and better known to the general 
public, hence reducing the degree of uncer­
tainty that affects policy-making with long­
term payoffs. For example, while the overall 
long-term effects of a debt brake is difficult 
to establish, it defines a clear and stable 
threshold that can be easily understood and 
monitored by the layman.
In short, intergenerational provisions may, 
when enshrined in a constitutional text 
and backed with credible enforcing mech­
anisms, enhance the substantive legitimacy 
of public policy-making in intergeneration- 
ally sensitive domains. They can do so in at 
least the three ways discussed in this section: 
by m itigating short-sightedness, by ena­
bling coordination, and by shaping citizens’ 
values and beliefs — which in turn provide 
reasons why this sort of provision may im­
prove the substantive legitimacy of present 
policy-making. These reasons are not deci­
sive, however. They are merely p ro  tanto. In 
order to arrive at an all-things-considered 
judgement about whether intergenerational 
provisions are on balance legitimate, they 
need to be examined along with alternative 
reasons regarding the intergenerational le­
gitimacy concerns that such provisions may 
generate, which we turn to examine in the 
next section.
Legitimacy concerns — 
and how to address them
So far we have seen that there are good rea­
sons why constitutionalisation, when en­
shrining intergenerational provisions, may 
contribute to m itigating some problems 
faced by public policy-making in properly 
taking into account future individuals’ in­
terests, thus improving the substantive legit­
imacy of such policy-making. And, in turn, 
these legitimacy gains may outweigh proce­
dural legitimacy losses, if  any, that constitu- 
tionalisation m ay generate, given how badly 
we need institutional mechanisms to extend 
the time horizon of policy-making in inter- 
generationally sensitive realms. Before such 
conclusion can be established, however, 
we need to carefully consider the potential 
procedural legitimacy losses that constitu- 
tionalisation may generate. In this section,
I shall first examine these potential losses. 
Next, I shall contend that, when consti­
tutional provisions are properly adopted, 
formulated, and amended, legitimacy losses 
can be importantly mitigated. Since, unlike 
in the case of intergenerational benefits, 
such losses often sim ilarly — yet not iden­
tically — affect intergenerational and other 
types of provisions, what follows similarly
— yet not identically — applies to the latter, 
as we shall see.
When enshrined in a constitutional 
text and backed with credible 
enforcing mechanisms, [intergene­
rational provisions may] enhance 
the substantive legitimacy of public 
policy-making in intergenerationally 
sensitive domains.
Before proceeding, the following caveat is in 
order. Legitimacy concerns raised by consti­
tutional provisions may be intra- and inter­
generational. Hence, for example, the fact 
that unelected and unaccountable officials 
typically enact constitutional provisions 
raises serious democratic worries (the so- 
called “counter-majoritarian difficulty”) .13 
Yet this worry is purely intra-generational. 
It is not a worry that follows from the sort 
of relationship that different generations 
have with each other. Since the goal of this 
paper is to examine the in ter-generational 
legitimacy of constitutionalism, we mostly 
leave aside these concerns. In this section 
we focus, thus, on the intergenerational le­
gitimacy worries it generates.
These worries are twofold.
First, given that constitutions are by defi­
nition rigid — i.e. they typically impose
amendment requirements that are more 
cumbersome than ordinary law-making 
procedures, such as parliamentary superma­
jorities or approval by referendum — future 
generations will have a hard time amending 
the constitution’s content and, as society 
evolves, such content may no longer reflect 
future individuals’ interests and circum- 
stances.14 Constitutionalisation may thus 
make the entrenched provisions impossible 
to adjust with promptness and flexibility to 
changing circumstances. And, given how 
uncertain the founding generation’s knowl­
edge about the future is, constitutional 
provisions may end up being suboptimal, if  
not harmful, to future individuals’ interests. 
Call this the en tren chm en t concern.
Second, regardless of whether future inter­
ests happen to shift or not, constitutional- 
isation threatens future generations’ sover­
eignty, i.e. their ability to live under laws of 
their own choosing; for then, future gener­
ations — while bound by the constitutional- 
ised provisions — will not have consented to 
their content and will not be able to easily 
amend it. Call this the sovereignty concern.
It is worth noting that, while the sovereign­
ty concern is related to the entrenchment 
concern — as interests are likely to shift 
over time, and future individuals are likely 
to no longer see their interests reflected by 
the constitution’s content, hence wishing to 
amend it — it is also distinct. For even if  no 
interest shift occurred, and circumstances 
remained the same over time, future indi­
viduals would not have consented to the 
constitution and would not be able to easily 
amend its content all the same. As it is often 
argued, sovereignty is a modally demanding 
concept.15 It refers to the ability to live un­
der rules of one’s own choosing, both under 
actual and non-actual circumstances and re­
gardless of whether such ability is exercised 
or not. It is accordingly threatened when­
ever no consent by those who are bound by 
a given set of rules has occurred, or when 
they happen to be unable to amend or 
repeal such rules if  they wish.
The following also pays noting. W hile these 
two concerns sim ilarly affect intergenera­
tional provisions and other sorts of provi­
sions alike, they are especially worrisome 
in the former case. For, unlike provisions 
whose nature is not particularly intergen­
erational, intergenerational provisions may 
end up departing from the interests and 
circumstances, as well as threatening the 
sovereignty, of the very same individuals, 
i.e. future generations, whose interests they
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purportedly aim to advance — and, paradox­
ically enough, doing it on their behalf.
Given how uncertain the founding 
generation’s knowledge about the 
future is, constitutional provisions 
may end up being suboptimal, if 
not harmful, to future individuals’ 
interests.
No easy solutions are available for these 
problems. As noted above, we should bear 
in mind that, even if  no means at all ex­
isted to mitigate them, given how badly 
needed reforms to better take into account 
future individuals’ interests in policy-making 
are, we may want to forgo sovereignty and 
to take some risks in defining what the 
content of such interests w ill be in consti­
tution-making. However, such means are 
available. There are a number of ways in 
which intergenerational provisions may be 
adopted, formulated, and amended in order 
to mitigate these problems — or so I shall 
argue in the remainder of the paper.
One such way is to lim it, at the formulation 
stage, the content of constitutional provi­
sions to those interests that are unlikely to 
shift over time and across generations — i.e. 
to basic or fundamental interests — so as to 
make the provisions’ content more likely to 
reflect the interests of future individuals. 
Ekeli has advanced a proposal along these 
lines. He has argued that intergenerational 
provisions — or “posterity provisions”, as he 
terms them — be restricted to protect those 
critical natural resources that are necessary 
for future individuals to meet their basic 
physiological needs.16 Note, however, that 
this leaves the sovereignty concern intact. 
For it does not improve upon future in­
dividuals’ ability to amend the provisions’ 
content should they wish to do so. As much 
as future individuals may have their inter­
ests reflected in the constitution’s content, 
and accordingly protected, their consent, 
as well as their ability to easily amend the 
constitution’s content, remains absent all 
the same.
An alternative means consists — also at the 
formulation stage, even though it has im­
portant effects on enforcement — in con- 
stitutionalising the relevant provisions ab­
stractly, as general principles rather than 
specific rules. It should be noted that ab­
straction in formulation may make the 
intra-generational democratic worry men­
tioned above more acute, as abstraction 
gives courts more discretion to interpret the 
relevant provisions and makes them more
powerful as a result. It may also reduce the 
ability of intergenerational provisions to set 
specific goals that may clearly and predicta­
bly constrain public policy-making and that 
may enable coordination amongst private 
and public actors. However, abstraction 
no doubt brings intergenerational legiti­
macy benefits at the enforcement stage, for 
it makes it easier for courts to adjust their 
understanding to fit an evolving society, 
as circumstances and interests change over 
time. Abstractly defined provisions may 
thus minimise the dissonance between the 
interests of future individuals and the con­
stitution’s content.
However, it is unclear whether abstraction 
can fully address the sovereignty concern. 
For one thing, as much as courts may 
then have more discretion to adjust their 
understanding of the provisions’ content 
to the evolving interests of future individ­
uals, consent by those who are bound by 
such provisions remains absent. Abstractly 
formulated provisions are the upshot of a 
constitution-making process in which only 
the founding generation, and none of all 
the subsequent ones, have participated — 
no less than when constitutional provisions 
are formulated as precise rules. For another, 
even though abstraction m ay improve sub­
sequent generations’ ability to amend the 
interpretation of the provisions’ content, it 
does so very indirectly, via legal interpreta­
tion by courts — whose members are typ­
ically unelected and unaccountable to cit­
izens. Abstract, general principles provide, 
in short, no more consent and little more 
influence by future individuals than precise 
rules, and are thus unable to successfully ad­
dress the sovereignty concern.
Abstract, general principles provide, in 
short, no more consent and little more 
influence by future individuals than 
precise rules [...].
A third alternative focuses on the adoption 
stage. If the relevant provisions are adopted 
under conditions that are normatively more 
demanding than ordinary law-making — if, 
for example, they are adopted as a result of 
a deliberative and inclusive process in which 
well-informed citizens robustly engage and 
reach an ample consensus — constitutional 
rigidity may appear less like a constraint on 
present and future citizens, and more like 
a constraint on elected officials, who may 
be tempted, for electoral or other reasons, 
to deviate from the provisions’ content if
these are easily amendable or have no pri­
ority over ordinary statutes. Constitutional 
rigidity m ay then become a lim it on elected 
officials’ opportunism and short-sighted­
ness, rather than on citizens’ sovereignty, as 
Ackerman has famously argued.17 
To properly understand this argument, let 
us consider it from the standpoint of com­
mitment theory. Suppose an individual, A, 
commits at period P1 to take certain course 
of action at a later period, P2, and puts in 
place a mechanism to ensure that alterna­
tive courses of action at P2 be overridden. 
Sovereignty typically implies that A should 
be able to take whatever course of action she 
may wish to take at P2. Yet, her overriding 
commitment at P1 need not undermine her 
sovereignty at P2 if  her prior decision at P1 
is made under circumstances that are nor­
matively superior to those of P2. As illus­
tration, suppose that I pass my cell phone 
to a friend at P1, and ask him not to let me 
phone my ex-wife if  I get drunk at P2. If I 
happen to get drunk at P2 and m y friend 
refuses to give me the phone back, we tend 
not to say that his action diminishes my 
sovereignty. The reason for this is that my 
decision-making circumstances at P1 (I am 
sober) are normatively superior to those at 
P2 (I am drunk).
Similarly, constitutional rigidity need not 
undermine the sovereignty of subsequent 
generations, some commitment theorists 
contend, provided that the constitution 
is adopted under circumstances that are 
normatively superior to those of ordinary 
politics. If, unlike the latter, constitutional 
provisions are adopted under circumstanc­
es in which all citizens engage in politics, 
deliberate w ith each other at length, reflect 
carefully about the consequences of their 
choices, and reach ample consensus, then 
the fact that, once adopted, such provi­
sions’ content is difficult to amend need 
not thwart future generations’ sovereignty
— for it prevents elected officials, whose gaze 
often extends no further than the next elec­
tion, from easily deviating from such pro­
visions, while letting future citizens amend 
their content if  conditions that are as nor­
matively demanding as the conditions of 
the adoption obtain. Such conditions may 
include, in ter alia, the following:18
1. The constitution-making procedure may 
be triggered by popular initiative. For exam­
ple, the signature of a sufficiently large num­
ber of registered voters may force the parlia­
ment to call for a constitutional convention.
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2. The constitution is drafted by a conven­
tion called for that purpose and constituted 
by members of civil society (rather than by 
members of parliament, who may have elec­
toral or partisan motivations).
3. To ensure diversity and inclusiveness, 
members of the convention are appointed 
by lot. To improve descriptive representa­
tiveness, some seats are reserved for mem­
bers of minorities. Members of the conven­
tion receive on-going technical and legal 
advice.
4. If, alternatively, elections are employed 
to appoint the members of the convention, 
a proportional system rather than a majori­
ty system is used, to improve representative­
ness.
5. The document drafted by the conven­
tion is submitted to popular ratification by 
referendum and a m inimum turnout is re­
quired.
6. A deliberation day — a national holiday 
in which each deliberator is paid to engage 
in meetings in which experts provide the 
hard facts — is celebrated before the consti­
tution is ratified by referendum.
Commitment theories of constitutional­
ism have three main virtues for the issue at 
hand. First, they nicely spell out the condi­
tions that need to obtain, e.g. (1)—(6), for 
such provisions to be procedurally legiti­
mate. Given that, once granted constitu­
tional status, the relevant provisions have 
normative priority over ordinary statutes, as 
well as a pervasive impact on present and 
future citizens’ basic interests, and can only 
be amended by very cumbersome means, 
they need to be adopted as a result of a 
process that is exceptionally inclusive, de­
liberative, reflective, and acceptable to an 
ample majority of the population. Second, 
commitment theories nicely explain why, 
when such conditions obtain, constitution­
al provisions are much more legitimate than 
ordinary statutes — and why critics of such 
provisions’ content who were nonetheless 
able to participate in their adoption have 
little grounds for complaint. If they wish to 
amend their content, commitment theorists 
may retort, they should be able to success­
fully go through an amendment process 
whose conditions are as normatively de­
manding as those of the adoption process. 
Third, they show why, if  one accepts that 
the above conditions are necessary for the 
constitution’s content to be legitimate, per­
petuity clauses (i.e. clauses that cannot be 
amended by any means) have little hope of
ever being procedurally legitimate, however 
serious the interests they purport to protect 
may look to its framers.19
Constitutional rigidity need not 
undermine the sovereignty of sub­
sequent generations, some commit­
ment theorists contend, provided that 
the constitution is adopted under 
circumstances that are normatively 
superior to those of ordinary politics.
In short, commitment theories provide 
powerful tools to understand the legitimacy 
conditions of constitutionalism. Howev­
er, they fail to provide an entirely satisfac­
tory response to the sovereignty concern. 
If inclusion, deliberation, reflection, and 
ample consensus are sine qua non condi­
tions of a constitution’s legitimacy, then 
future citizens may still be able to issue a 
sensible complaint. For, as much as these 
four conditions could have been met in the 
adoption process, a legion of future citizens 
were not included in such process, and 
never had the chance to deliberate or reflect 
upon — let alone consent to — the constitu­
tion’s content.
It should come as no surprise, then, that a 
fourth option — namely the use of sunset 
clauses and of regular constitutional con­
ventions — has traditionally informed the 
debate on the intergenerational legitimacy 
of constitutional provisions. In the next sec­
tion, we turn to examine this option as well 
as its potential benefits and shortcomings.
Regular conventions and sunset clauses
The idea that every generation should hold 
a convention to revise and perhaps entirely 
replace the constitution’s content goes back 
to constitutional debates in the 18th cen­
tury. It emerged as a response to the sover­
eignty concern triggered by perpetual laws 
as well as by constitutions inherited from 
previous generations. The people, Jefferson 
argued, “are masters of their own persons, 
and consequently may govern them as they 
please.”20 This was the reason why Jeffer­
son believed that every generation should 
establish its own constitution and why 
keeping a constitution in force beyond the 
lifespan of its founding generation would 
render it illegitimate. “Each generation”, 
Jefferson reckoned, “is as independent of 
the one preceding, as that was of all which 
had gone before. It has then, like them, a 
right to choose for itself the form of govern­
ment it believes most promotive of its own 
happiness.”21
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the 
fact that the quote above refers to period­
ic constitutional convention in terms of a 
right, Jefferson went way beyond defend­
ing a mere opportunity to amend or repeal 
the constitution — as something that each 
generation could freely decide to exercise 
or not. He rather argued for mandatory 
periodic constitutional conventions as a 
way of respecting each generation’s sover- 
eignty.22 After studying a set of actuarial 
tables, Jefferson estimated that this should 
happen every 19 years. And, partly inspired 
by Jefferson, some 14 American states ac­
cordingly require the people to be regularly 
consulted by the legislature about whether 
to call a constitutional convention. Similar­
ly, the former Fijian Constitution of 1990 
mandated review every ten years, and Pap­
ua New Guinea’s Constitution establishes 
that a General Constitutional Commission 
should review the workings of the docu­
ment after three years.23 
Regular constitutional conventions are typ­
ically aimed at revising and, if  appropriate, 
replacing the entire constitutional text. 
W hen particular provisions are targeted, 
sunset clauses — which Jefferson also sup­
ported as a means to ensure that no dead 
generation could extend its w ill beyond 
its own lifespan — may be alternatively 
employed. Sunset constitutional clauses, 
which date back to Roman law, are clauses 
that establish that certain provision or set of 
provisions shall cease to have effect beyond 
a particular date, unless further action is 
taken to extend their duration. As illustra­
tion, suppose that an environmental provi­
sion setting a lim it on national greenhouse 
gas emissions is given constitutional status. 
Further suppose that the framers are unsure 
whether such a lim it will be appropriate in 
the future, as technical change may perhaps 
allow safe capture and storage of carbon 
emissions beyond the threshold set by the 
provision — or that they believe that the next 
generation should not have its hands tied to 
decide which level of emissions they want 
to establish for themselves. A sunset provi­
sion establishing that the provision should 
expire after, say, 30 years if  no further ac­
tion is taken may then make the relevant 
environmental provision flexible enough 
to adapt to changing circumstances. It may 
also make it respectful of the next genera­
tion’s sovereignty to set the environmental 
rules by which they wish to be bound.
Are these two means appropriate — and 
under what conditions — to successfully
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address the entrenchment and sovereignty 
concerns? More broadly, are they appropri­
ate to enhance the intergenerational legit­
imacy of constitutional intergenerational 
provisions? I address these questions by 
firstly discussing three intergenerational 
shortcomings of these means. I then ex­
amine the specific conditions under which 
these means may bring, if  any, intergenera­
tional legitimacy gains.
First, regarding the particular case of in­
tergenerational provisions, and bearing in 
mind the potential legitimacy gains dis­
cussed above, we should note that sunset 
clauses and periodic mandatory conven­
tions may seriously undermine the possibil­
ity of intergenerational coordination on the 
content of such provisions — which crucial­
ly  depends on the provisions’ content be­
ing stable over time and across generations. 
Properly taking future generations’ interests 
into account often requires making deci­
sions (e.g. investing in blue-sky research, or 
developing low-carbon technology) whose 
outcomes are located in the long run and 
that need to be consistently enacted over 
extended periods of time. As we have dis­
cussed above, the constitutionalisation of 
intergenerational conventions may enable 
coordination across generations by making 
such provisions’ content stable and resilient 
to change.
Sunset clauses and periodic mandatory 
conventions may jeopardise such stability 
across time, undermining the possibility of 
intergenerational coordination as a result. 
Further, uncertainty about the long-term 
resilience of the provisions’ content may 
have an important effect on citizens’ w ill­
ingness to endorse far-sighted policies, i.e. 
policies with benefits expected in the long 
run — for, as Jacobs and Matthews have 
shown, such willingness is decisively shaped 
by citizens’ beliefs about whether future 
incumbents will abandon (e.g. for elector­
al or partisan reasons) previously adopted 
far-sighted policies.24 If citizens believe this 
is likely to happen, they are less likely to 
endorse policies whose payoff is uncertain
— something that is more likely to happen if 
the constitutional framework within which 
such policies are adopted and sustained is 
unstable.
Second, and turning to one of the main
aims of sunset clauses and periodic manda­
tory conventions — namely to uphold each 
generation’s sovereignty — it should be noted 
that mandatory  expiration and amendment 
dates might also constrain future genera­
tions’ sovereignty. Indeed, it might do so 
perhaps more than the absence thereof. 
W hy should citizens be forced to abandon a 
well functioning constitution? W hy should 
they be forced to engage in a costly pro­
cess aimed at deciding whether they want 
to revise or repeal a constitution they wish 
not to change? If we are tru ly committed 
to future generations’ ability to live under 
rules of their own choosing, setting man­
datory expiration or amendment dates may 
thwart their sovereignty to greater extent 
than merely including the opportunity of 
amending, or entirely repealing, the docu­
ment in the constitution — for the former 
may impose a course of action that future 
generations m ay not want to take, or not 
at the specific date set by the expiration or 
amendment clause, while the latter may 
leave the opportunity of doing so open to 
them. This is even more so if  the condi­
tions under which the constitution may be 
amended are, albeit cumbersome, particu­
larly inclusive, deliberative, and democratic, 
such as the ones spelled out in the previous 
section.
Why should citizens be forced to 
abandon a well functioning 
constitution? Why should they be 
forced to engage in a costly process 
aimed at deciding whether they 
want to revise or repeal a constitution 
they wish not to change?
Third, and related to the previous point, set­
ting mandatory  expiration and amendment 
dates m ay induce amendment or repealing 
processes that score lower than spontane­
ous amendment or repealing processes in 
terms of citizens’ inclusion, participation, 
deliberation, and consensus-reaching. As 
Ackerman contends, constitutional adop­
tion and amendment processes only achieve 
legitimacy as a result of slow-motion pro­
cesses, in which the relevant issue firstly en­
ters the constitutional agenda — pushed by 
activists and pressure groups — beyond daily 
competition amongst partisan factions, as it 
is considered of sufficient depth, breadth, 
and decisiveness.25 It then gives way to an 
increasingly specific proposal, which is fol­
lowed by the calling for a constitutional 
convention and a process of intense popular 
deliberation and engagement, only to final­
ly  result, if  successful, in formal codifica­
tion. To be sure, nothing prevents artificial­
ly  established expiration and amendment 
dates from being inclusive, participatory, 
and deliberative in this sense, as well as 
from generating ample consensus. Yet this 
is less likely to happen compared to those 
cases in which constitutional amendment is 
allowed by the constitution and it occurs, if 
at all, spontaneously, when citizens are suffi­
ciently mobilised, ample deliberation takes 
place, and consensus is reached.
In short, the use of sunset clauses and man­
datory periodic conventions are fraught 
with difficulties from the standpoint of their 
intergenerational legitimacy. In the case of 
intergenerational provisions, sunset clauses’ 
difficulties are probably insurmountable — 
for, unlike provisions whose content is not 
particularly intergenerational, intergener­
ational provisions’ substantive legitimacy 
crucially depends, as discussed above, on 
their stability over time and across genera­
tions, as well as on their ability to generate 
legal certainty amongst citizens and private 
and public institutions alike.
Different conclusions may be reached with 
regard to periodic conventions, provided 
no expiration of the constitution’s con­
tent occurs in the absence of normatively 
cumbersome amendment procedures and a 
successful ratification by referendum — for 
then the outcome does not very much differ 
from ordinary constitutional amendment 
requirements, while future generations’ sov­
ereignty is nonetheless greatly improved. 
Let me explain. If mandatory periodic con­
stitutional conventions impose procedures 
that are normatively demanding, then le­
gal uncertainty is greatly reduced, as the 
constitution’s content will turn out to be 
amended only if  cumbersome requirements 
of inclusion, deliberation, reflection, and 
consensus — such as conditions (1)—(6) out­
lined in the previous section — are reached. 
If, by contrast, they are not, then the con­
stitution’s content remains the same. Yet, 
unlike in the case of voluntary amendment 
procedures, future individuals cannot ob­
ject that the will of the founding generation 
has been imposed on them, for they have 
the opportunity of amending the constitu­
tion’s content, and — unlike in the case of 
purely voluntary amendment procedures, 
which if  cumbersome enough often become 
a dead letter and are seldom exercised — this 
opportunity is realised in the form of a con­
stitutional convention that is compulsorily 
held at least once in their lifetime.
Jefferson argued for mandatory 
periodic constitutional conventions as 
a way of respecting each generation’s 
sovereignty.
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Conclusion
Two main conclusions can be drawn. First, 
while constitutionalism often raises inter­
generational procedural legitimacy con­
cerns, these concerns may be importantly 
mitigated if constitutional provisions, in­
tergenerational or otherwise, are properly 
adopted, formulated, and amended. lf  they 
are phrased abstractly, as general principles 
rather than precise rules, and if they are 
adopted and amended under normatively 
cumbersome conditions of inclusion, 
deliberation and ratification — whether by 
voluntary amendment procedures or in 
periodic constitutional conventions — then 
they may be able to adapt to future gener­
ations’ evolving interests and circumstances 
w ith promptness and to uphold future indi­
viduals’ ability to live under constitutional 
rules of their own choosing.
Second, the sceptic m ay want to call into 
question the first conclusion. She may want 
to protest that, no matter how constitution­
al provisions are adopted, formulated and 
amended, sovereignty concerns endure. 
Let us assume this is the case. W hile these 
concerns are probably insurmountable with 
regard to provisions whose content is not 
particularly intergenerational, they are not 
when it comes to intergenerational provi­
sions — for, whatever their intergenerational 
legitimacy shortcomings, these are likely to 
be outweighed by their legitimacy gains, 
given how badly we need public policy­
making to be more sensitive to future in­
dividuals’ interest in policy domains, such 
as climate change mitigation and adap­
tation, in which such interests are likely to 
be seriously harmed. As we have seen, the 
constitutionalisation of intergenerational 
provisions may importantly contribute to 
mitigate short-sightedness, enable coor­
dination, and shape citizens’ values and 
beliefs about intergenerational matters.
Notes
1 For comments on a previous version of 
the paper, l am grateful to three anonymous 
reviewers.
2 For discussions of this sort of provision, 
see Brandl/Bungert 1992; May/Daly 2009;
Hayward 2005; Tremmel 2006; Ekeli 2007; 
Cho/Pedersen 2012; González-Ricoy forth­
coming.
3 On the idea of intergenerational 
legitimacy, see Gosseries forthcoming; 
González-Ricoy/Gosseries forthcoming: 
16-20.
4 Gosseries 2008.
5 l am grateful to an anonymous reviewer 
for raising this point.
6 The label is stipulative. These provisions 
have also been termed as “posterity provi­
sions” (Ekeli 2007) and as “clauses for inter­
generational justice” (Tremmel 2006).
7 See May/Daly 2009: 239.
8 Trillium Case, Decision No. 2.732-96, 
Supreme Court (March 19, 1997, Chile). 
See May/Daly 2009 for a more detailed 
account of the decision.
9 For a court decision in which intergen­
erational standing is even more clearly 
acknowledged, see M inors Oposa v. Factoran, 
G.R. No. 10183, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, July 
30, 1993 (Philippines).
10 Buchanan 2016.
11 The first and third benefits are examined 
in greater detail in González-Ricoy forth­
coming. See also Hayward 2005; Tremmel 
2006.
12 On the expressive effects of the law  see, 
in ter a lia , McAdams 2000; Dharmapala/ 
McAdams 2003.
13 About this concern, see, in ter a lia , 
Dworkin 1995; Waldron 1999; Eisgruber 
2001. See also González-Ricoy 2013 for 
an attempt to relate this to the intergenera­
tional angle.
14 The degree of rigidity negatively corre­
lates w ith the number of times that a consti­
tution is amended, as Lutz 2004 has shown.
15 Southwood 2015.
16 Ekeli 2007.
17 Ackerman 1991.
18 On these and further conditions, see 
Elster 1995, 1998; Ackerman/Fishkin 2002; 
Schwartzberg 2013; Landemore 2015.
19 We should bear in m ind that, as pointed 
out above, one might nonetheless want to 
forgo procedural legitimacy if  the stakes are 
sufficiently high (think, for example, of hu­
man rights in the German Basic Law, which 
along with other fundamental principles are 
protected by a perpetuity clause).
20 Jefferson 1999: 596.
21 Jefferson 1999: 216.
22 Holmes 1997: 2005.
23 Elkins et al. 2009: 13-14.
24 Jacobs/Matthews 2012.
25 Ackerman 1991.
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